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Constitutional Possibilities †
LAWRENCE B. SOLUM !
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF ILLUSORY CONSTITUTIONAL POSSIBILITIES
What are our constitutional possibilities? The importance of this question is
illustrated by the striking breadth of constitutional possibilities discussed recently in
high constitutional theory. Contemporary constitutional theory ranges from Sotirios
Barber’s reading of the United States Constitution as a guarantee of fundamental
economic equality1 to Randy Barnett’s call to restore a lost constitution that guarantees
individual liberty. 2 The range of constitutional options includes James Fleming’s
perfectionist reading of the Constitution as a charter for deliberative autonomy 3 and
Sanford Levinson’s proselytization for a revolutionary program of constitutional
redesign that would abolish the Electoral College and equal representation of the states
in the Senate. 4 Are these constitutional possibilities real or illusory? And how can we
answer that question?
Theorists like Barber, Barnett, Fleming, and Levinson are conventionally
understood as placing constitutional options on the table and as proponents of their

† " 2007 by the Author. Permission is hereby granted to duplicate this paper for
scholarly or teaching purposes, including permission to reproduce multiple copies or post on the
Internet for classroom use and to quote extended passages in scholarly work, subject only to the
requirement that this copyright notice, the title of the article, and the name of the author be
prominently included in the copy or extended excerpt. Permission is hereby granted to use short
excerpts (500 words or less each, so long as the total word count of the excerpts does not exceed
50% of the total word count of the paper) with an appropriate citation and without inclusion of a
copyright notice. In the event of the death or permanent incapacity of the author, all claims to
copyright in the work are relinquished and the work is dedicated to the public domain in
perpetuity. Even if the author is then living, all copyright claims are relinquished as of January
1, 2050.
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Law and Legal Theory at the University of Texas, the faculty of the University of Minnesota
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to Mark Greenberg for detailed and illuminating comments that both sharpened the argument
and made its expression more consistent and precise. Residual errors are, of course, entirely my
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1. SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, WELFARE AND THE CONSTITUTION (2005).
2. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY (2004).
3. JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF AUTONOMY
(2006).
4. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION
GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006).
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adoption—in other words, as advocates of constitutional change. Normative
constitutional theory asks the question whether these options are desirable—whether
political actors (citizens, legislators, executives, or judges) should take action to bring
about their plans for constitutional reform or revolution. Frequently, normative
constitutional theories are criticized on the ground that they are undesirable, unwise, or
inconsistent with the best theories of political morality and legitimate legal authority,
but sometimes one hears a very different form of criticism, expressed in locutions such
as the following: “That is unrealistic.” “That’s not possible.” “That is pie in the sky.”
“You are imagining castles in the air.” “Your suggestion is utopian.” “That isn’t
feasible.” These objections invoke the idea of illusory constitutional possibility—
constitutional options that are not actual possibilities.
This Essay addresses issues of constitutional possibility and necessity: What are our
constitutional possibilities? How should we think about the feasible choice set for
constitutional change? What are the differences between ideal and nonideal theory?
What role should the ideas of path dependency and of second best play in
constitutional theory? These inquiries cross the lines between normative, positive, and
conceptual constitutional theory. At the conceptual level, we can analyze the content
and meaning of phrases like “constitutional possibility,” “ideal theory,” and “the
feasible choice set.” 5 At the level of positive constitutional theory, we can ask about
the forces and institutions that condition constitutional possibility. At the level of
normative constitutional theory, we can ask about the implications of constitutional
possibility for political morality. 6
Our investigation of constitutional possibility will proceed as follows. Part I will
cobble together a conceptual toolkit for thinking about possibility and necessity in
constitutional theory: the tools will range from the familiar distinction between ideal
and nonideal theory to a quick and dirty guide to the metaphysics of modality. Part II
discusses three errors: the reduction of possibility to cost, the inference of practical
possibility from conceivability, and the confusion of possibility and probability. Part
III will explore the implications of the resulting proto-theory of constitutional
possibility in two stages: stage one will investigate the normative implications,
whereas stage two will reconnoiter a set of standards for making modal claims in
constitutional arguments. Part IV provides two case studies in constitutional
possibility: Sanford Levinson’s proposal for a Convention to enact structural reform of
the United States Constitution, and Justice Antonin Scalia’s argument for originalism

5. I do not intend to take a stand on the methodology or utility of conceptual analysis—
beyond the minimalist point that such analysis can, at the very least, clarify the obscure,
disambiguate the ambiguous, and specify the vague.
6. Before we proceed further, we should note meanings of the phrases “constitutional
possibility” and “constitutional necessity” that are related to, but distinct from, the sense in
which the phrase is used in this paper. We could use the phrase “constitutional possibility” to
refer to those legal actions (in the broad sense that includes executive actions and orders, rules
and legislation, and judicial decisions) that are possibly in compliance with or authorized by the
constitution of some jurisdiction—that is, possibly constitutional under the United States
Constitution. Similarly, the phrase “constitutional necessity” could be used to refer to those
legal actions that are required by a constitution. And finally, constitutional necessity might be
used in connection with the “necessary and proper clause” of the United States Constitution. For
the most part, these senses of constitutional possibility and necessity will be set aside for the
remainder of this essay.
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as a method of constitutional interpretation. The Essay concludes with the problem of
false constitutional necessity.
I. A CONCEPTUAL TOOLKIT FOR THINKING ABOUT CONSTITUTIONAL POSSIBILITY
How can we think about constitutional possibility? This Part suggests a toolkit with
eight elements: (1) an explication of the distinction between ideal and nonideal
constitutional theory; (2) the idea of a constitutional second best; (3) path dependency;
(4) the notion of the feasible choice set; (5) agent relativity; (6) the scope of decision
problem; (7) a quick and dirty guide to the metaphysics of modality; and (8) a very
short introduction to positive constitutional theory.
A. The Distinction Between Ideal and Nonideal Constitutional Theory
One way to think about constitutional possibilities begins with the distinction
between ideal constitutions and constitutions that are made for a world that is less than
ideal. This distinction can be approached by borrowing the distinction between “ideal”
and “nonideal” theory from John Rawls. 7 By “ideal theory,” Rawls means to refer to a
moral or political theory that satisfies a condition of “full compliance” or “strict
compliance.” Nonideal theory studies conditions of “partial compliance,” and hence
addresses topics such as theories of punishment, civil disobedience, and justified
revolution. 8 Thus, we can ask:
What principles ought a society to adopt for the purposes of designing its
institutional structure on the condition that all of the institutions in society
conform to these principles? 9

The parallel question of normative constitutional theory might be phrased as follows:
What constitution ought a society to adopt for the purposes of designing its basic
legal structure on the condition that all of the institutions in society conform to the
constitution?

In other words, we can ask what constitution we ought to adopt, assuming that perfect
compliance—each branch of government always respecting the limits on its power and
the rights (if any) that the constitution confers on individuals.
By way of contrast, we can ask questions of nonideal constitutional theory:
What constitution ought a society to adopt for the purposes of designing its basic
legal structure on the condition that the institutions of society will violate the
constitution to the extent, and under the circumstances, that are predicted on the
best understandings of human psychology and political science?

7. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 7–8, 215–16, 308–09 (rev. ed. 1999); Michael
Phillips, Reflections on the Transition from Ideal to Non-Ideal Theory, 19 NOÛS 551 (1985).
8. See RAWLS, supra note 7, at 8.
9. Phillips, supra note 7, at 553.
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That is, we might assume that constitutional actors will sometimes fail to comply with
their constitutional duties by exceeding their allocated powers or violating the
constitutional rights of individuals. Of course, the conditions for departure from perfect
compliance can themselves be varied by making different assumptions about human
psychology and institutional behavior or in some other way. Nonideal constitutional
theory deals with the unconstitutional; the institution of judicial review might be seen
as a paradigmatic topic for nonideal constitutional theory. 10
It seems obvious that ideal and nonideal constitutional theories may differ. For
example, because ideal constitutional theory assumes perfect compliance, the ideal
constitution might dispense with the institution of judicial review, whereas nonideal
theory might posit the necessity of such review in order to correct constitutional
violations. Similarly, nonideal constitutional theory might adopt a constitutional rule
that would not be ideal, but that would produce the best consequences given imperfect
compliance. For example, the executive might be given a sphere of power more
constrained than would be ideal because of an assumption that the executive will
overreach and enlarge the sphere of executive power beyond constitutional limits.
How does the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory relate to possibility?
One might think that ideal theory deals with that which is not possible, whereas
nonideal theory deals with the realm of that which is possible, but which would be a
mistake. Perfect compliance may be impossible, but there is no a priori reason to
believe that this is always so. Some constitutional provisions regularly result in perfect
compliance. No President has been younger than 35 years of age; no state has had
three Senators seated simultaneously; no state has opted for a monarchical form of
government. Indeed, in cases like these, less than perfect compliance may be very
unlikely or even “impossible” in some sense. Nonetheless, for a wide range of cases,
perfect compliance may not be feasible and nonideal constitutional theory may be the
norm.
The better understanding of the relationship between ideal and nonideal theory is
that ideal theory allows us to bracket certain kinds of impossibility—we can explore
the implications of making unrealistic assumptions about compliance with
constitutional norms. Nonideal theory allows us to explore the implications of realistic
assumptions about human nature and social organization that (under some
circumstances) make unconstitutionality a central problem for constitutional theory.
The ideal and the impossible are not equivalent, but they are related in an important (if
contingent) way.
For this reason, the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory is an important
tool for normative constitutional theory. The enterprise of ideal theory circumvents
certain recurring types of impossibility objections—it allows us to engage in normative
investigation while we set some issues of feasibility to the side. The enterprise of
nonideal theory puts those feasibility issues back on the table. At an even more abstract
level, Rawls’s distinction between ideal and nonideal theory points to the more general
conceptual tool—the idealizing assumption, an essential component in a variety of

10. Of course, other institutions (such as congressional committees or executive offices)
may deal with unconstitutionality outside the courts. See generally James E. Fleming, The
Constitution Outside the Courts, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 215 (2000); Laurence Gene Sager, Fair
Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212
(1978).
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formal models (for example, economic and positive political theory models). 11 The
movement between ideal and nonideal theory suggests the more general phenomena of
making and then relaxing idealizing assumptions—including idealizing assumptions
about possibility and feasibility. Idealizing assumptions allow the normative issues to
be framed clearly and simply; relaxing those assumptions enables the move from
constitutional theory to constitutional practice.
B. The Idea of a Constitutional Second Best
A second tool for reflection upon constitutional possibilities is the idea of a
constitutional second best. 12 To employ this tool, we can borrow economic theory’s
distinction between “first-best” and “second-best” states of affairs. 13 The general idea
of the theory of the second best can be expressed as follows. Assume a system with
multiple variables. Take the most desirable state the whole system could assume and
the associated values that all of the variables must assume to produce this state: call
this condition the first-best state of the system and call the associated values of the
variables the first-best values. Now assume that at least one variable cannot assume the
value necessary for the first-best state of the whole system: call this (or these) the
constrained variable(s). Identify the most desirable state the whole system could
assume given the constrained variable and the associated values that all the
unconstrained variables must assume to produce this state: call this the second-best
state of the system. There are systems in which achieving the second-best state will
require that at least one variable other than the constrained variable assume a value
other than the first-best value: call this value the second-best value. One expects that
there are examples where many or even all variables must assume second-best values.

11. See generally Daniel M. Hausman, Philosophy of Economics, in STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, Sept. 12, 2003, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/economics/
(“Economics raises questions concerning the legitimacy of severe abstraction and idealization.
For example, mainstream economic models often stipulate that everyone is perfectly rational
and has perfect information or that commodities are infinitely divisible. Such claims are
exaggerations, and they are clearly false. Other schools of economics may not employ
idealizations that are this extreme, but there is no way to do economics if one is not willing to
simplify drastically and abstract from many complications.”).
12. What is the relationship between the economic distinction between first best and second
best and the philosophical distinction between ideal and nonideal theory? Clearly the two
notions are related, and one might be tempted to equate “first best” with “ideal” and “second
best” with “nonideal.” If these phrases are used loosely (and acknowledged as such), there is no
problem with this equation. We could simply stipulate that “ideal” means “first best.” But in
their technical senses, the two notions overlap but are not identical. Perfect compliance might be
worse than imperfect compliance, so the “ideal” theory might be about the “second-best” state
of the system. Compliance may not be the only relevant variable that could be constrained, so
there could be “second-best” states of the system that cannot be differentiated from “first-best”
states on the basis of the ideal/nonideal distinction. However, when compliance is the
constrained variable and perfect compliance produces the best state of the system, there is a
relevant mapping between ideal and nonideal theory and first-best and second-best states of the
system.
13. See generally R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24
REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956) (articulating the theory of second best in economics).
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Notice that the formal economic idea of the second best is always relative to which
variables are constrained. To take a very simple illustration: if a system has three
variables (a, b, and c), there could be three “second-best” states of the system—one
relative to the assumption that variable a is constrained, another relative to assumed
constraint of b, and a third relative to assumed constraint of c. More generally, what
counts as second best depends on assumptions about the set of possible or feasible
choices. Outside of formal theory, there may be a fact of the matter about which
variables are constrained, and hence there may be a unique constitutional second best.
The idea of a constitutional second best is found in Cass Sunstein and Adrian
Vermeule’s work on constitutional interpretation and institutional capacity. 14 In the
course of making their argument for simple-minded formalism as the second-best
theory of constitutional interpretation, Sunstein and Vermeule argue that the
institutional capacities of judges are a constraining variable. 15 In particular, judicial
capacity may not be able to assume the value required by the first-best theory of
constitutional interpretation.16 Therefore, another variable, that is the normative theory
of interpretive methodology must assume a second-best value in order to produce the
second-best state of the system of constitutional interpretation. In other words, if the
judiciary lacks the institutional capacity to do what first-best theories require, then an
institutional theory is required in order to produce second-best outcomes. For this
reason, “institutional analysis is necessary, even if not sufficient, to an adequate
evaluation of interpretive methods.” 17
The notion of a “constitutional second best” should be differentiated from the role
that the second best plays in formal economic theory. In that realm, the notion of a
constrained variable is treated as an assumption: given that variable v cannot be
assigned its first-best system value p then the second-best state of the whole system
requires that variable u assume value r and not its first-best system value q. The notion
of a constrained variable operates in a formal model—which may or may not be
accurate or useful as a description of the world. Normative constitutional theory is
rarely “formal”: concepts like “legitimacy,” “rights of political morality,” and
“coherence of the legal materials” create difficult, if not intractable, problems of
formalization. So the idea of a constitutional second best should not be understood on
the model of an assumed constraint on a variable. Rather, the idea is that certain
choices or options are outside the set of choices that are feasible or possible. Secondbest constitutional outcomes are understood as the products of choices made by actual
constitutional actors—that is, as states of the world rather than as states of formal
models.
C. Path Dependency
The general idea of path dependency is that prior decisions constrain (or expand)
the subsequent range of possible or feasible choices.18 That is, a decision, d, made at
14. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 885 (2003).
15. See id. at 914.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 915.
18. See PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS
(2004); Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 251 (2000). The discussion in the text focuses on path dependency in the context
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time t1 may affect the choice set, S = (c1, c2, . . . cn), at time t2. We can define a choice
set as a set of actions that a given agent could take. Or to expand the path metaphor, if
we imagine a network of paths through time, from past to future, decisions to branch at
an earlier point on the chosen path may affect the destinations that one can reach from
a later point on the path. Sometimes, if we choose the left fork, we may be able to
reach exactly the same destinations we could have reached via the right fork, but other
times, our choices foreclose some possibilities altogether. It isn’t always the case that
in the long run, there’s still time to change the road you’re on. 19
This general notion can be specified in various ways. First, we can specify the type
of effect that a decision has on the choice set. One type of effect is an effect on which
actions are members of the choice set. Thus, by making a decision d at t1, the resulting
choice set at t2 would have members c1, c2, and c3, but if the decision had been d! (d
prime), then the choice set at t2 would have members c1, c3, and c4. In this illustrative
case, making decision d rather than d! both added and subtracted from the choice set at
t2. Another type of effect is an effect on the costs associated with the actions that are
members of the choice set. That is, decision, d, might result in the price of a given
choice P(c1) being greater than that price would have been if an alternative decision, d!,
had been made. Notice, however, that if we include price in the specification (or
description) that designates a choice, then this second type of effect (that is, a cost
effect) is reducible to the first type of effect (a possibility effect).
A second way in which we can specify the general notion of path dependency is to
describe the causal pathway by which decisions affect future choices. On the one hand,
one might use the phrase “path dependency” to refer to all causal mechanisms.20 On
the other hand, we could reserve the phrase for a specific type of causal mechanism.
For example, Paul Pierson has suggested that the notion of path dependency should be
limited to what he calls “positive feedback.” 21 Positive feedback (or selfreinforcement) involves the idea that as time progresses, the relative benefit of
maintaining some feature of the system (and hence the relative costliness of modifying
or eliminating that feature) increases. Once a constitution has been adopted and gone
into effect, it becomes more costly to adopt a different constitution. Once a federal
system has been created out of sovereign subunits, it becomes more costly to eliminate
the federal (or national) government. Once a judicial precedent has been established
and relied upon, the costs of reversal grow.
A third way in which we can specify the idea of path dependency is by
differentiating between the ways in which path dependency might lead to suboptimal
outcomes. 22 Following Liebowitz and Margolis, 23 we can distinguish three
possibilities. First, in some cases, the decision, d, at t1 may have been the best possible
of decision and choice, but the notion could be generalized to include causal processes that do
not involve choice.
19. See LED ZEPPELIN, Stairway to Heaven, on LED ZEPPELIN IV (Atlantic 1971).
20. William H. Sewell, Jr., Three Temporalities: Towards an Eventful Sociology, in THE
HISTORIC TURN IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES 245, 262–63 (Terrence J. McDonald ed., 1996)
(describing the idea of path dependency as “that what has happened at an earlier point in time
will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time”).
21. PIERSON, supra note 18, at 20–21.
22. Id. at 28; see also Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Costs Economics and
Organizational Theory, 2 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 107 (1993).
23. S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependency, Lock-in, and History, 11 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995).
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decision—the consequences are “path dependent” (caused by d), but no better outcome
was possible. Second, in other cases, it may be that there was an alternative decision,
d!, that would have led to a better outcome, but that given the information available at
t1, the better alternative could not have been identified. Third, in a final set of cases, it
could be that the information available at t1 was sufficient to allow the relevant actors
to switch from d to d! based on the undesirable outcome at t2. This third form of “path
dependency” is sometimes called “remediable path dependency.”24 The first two forms
are nonremediable.
D. The Notion of the Feasible Choice Set
The idea of a constitutional second best and the distinction between ideal and
nonideal theory are related to a more fundamental notion—the feasible choice set. We
might think of a variety of choice sets: the set of all conceivable or imaginable choices,
the set of all actions that specified actors might choose, and so forth. Of all the
conceivable choices that might be made by a specified actor (individual, institutional,
or collective) with respect to a given constitutionally relevant situation, some can be
called “feasible” and others “infeasible.”
The term “feasible” as used in natural language is vague, ambiguous, and context
dependent. Feasibility is vague because feasibility can be a matter of degrees, with
some choices that are neither clearly feasible nor infeasible. Feasibility is ambiguous
because it can refer to possibility, workability, practicality, costliness, or some
combination of these. Feasibility is context dependent, because a given action type or
action token may be considered practical given one constellation of purpose and
available alternative actions, but the same action may be considered impractical given
different purposes and alternatives.25 For example, constitutional amendment might be
considered “feasible” in the context of a particular constitutional problem, say abortion
or equal treatment for women, but “infeasible” in the context of another problem, say
treatment of billboards under the First Amendment or power of the states to legalize
medical uses of marijuana.
Given that “feasibility” is vague, ambiguous, and context dependent, claims that a
given constitutional option is inside or outside of the feasible choice set require further
specification. At a minimum the criteria for inclusion or exclusion require explicit
definition. But once the criteria for inclusion are specified, the idea of a feasible choice
set provides a useful heuristic for expressing assumptions about (or conclusions
reached) with respect to possibility.
E. Agent Relativity
Feasibility is a function of both the constitutional option itself and the agent or
agents for whom the option is proposed. Constitutional agents range from individual

24. See Pierson, supra note 18, at 255.
25. An “action type” is a universal, for example, “constitutional amendment” or “reversal
of a Supreme Court precedent.” An “action token” is a particular, for example, “ratification of
the Equal Rights Amendment” or “reversal of Brown v. Board of Education.” See Linda Wetzel,
Types and Tokens, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, Apr. 28, 2006,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/types-tokens/ (explaining the type-token distinction).
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citizens and institutional actors (e.g., senators, representatives, presidents, legislators,
justices, and judges) to institutions (e.g., Congress, the Supreme Court, the Illinois
State Legislature) and collectivities (e.g., We the People of the United States, the
Congress and Legislatures of the Fifty States).
A given constitutional option might be infeasible relative to one agent, but feasible
relative to another. Ordinarily, constitutional amendments are outside the feasible
choice set for ordinary individual citizens: the cases in which an individual citizen can
bring about the enactment of a constitutional amendment are rare and even when they
exist may be difficult to identify ex ante. Relative to an individual senator,
representative, or state legislator, some constitutional amendments may be feasible
(because they have sufficient support from others to create a practical possibility of
enactment) and others infeasible (because they lack such support). But relative to the
collective actor with the power to propose and ratify (Congress and the state
legislatures), constitutional amendments are always feasible, because action by this
collective agent is legally sufficient to amend the Constitution. Because feasibility is
agent relative, a fully specified claim that a given option is inside or outside the
feasible choice set must specify the agent. Absent such specification (explicit or
implicit), feasibility claims are so ambiguous as to be virtually meaningless.
F. The Scope of Decision Problem
Agency is related to another dimension of feasibility, which we can call “scope of
decision.” What does “scope of decision” mean? Sometimes our scope of decision is a
single action (an action token), such as the decision by a court in a single case. But not
all issues take single actions as their scope of decision.
Consider the following example: constitutional actors (e.g., executive officials,
legislators, judges, or courts) may choose whether to employ originalism as the
exclusive methodology for (or practice of) constitutional interpretation—as ultimate or
final criterion for the correctness of a constitutional interpretation. This decision cannot
be made on a case-by-case basis. Why not? This question can be answered via a
thought experiment. Suppose you tried to decide in each case whether to deploy
originalism as a methodology. How would you make that decision? You might make
an ad hoc, all-things-considered judgment in each case whether it would be better to be
an originalist or a living constitutionalist. But if you proceeded in that way, then you
would already have rejected originalism as the ultimate criterion for decision—because
your decision in the particular case would ultimately rest on “all things considered”
and not the original public meaning of the constitution. Notice that I am not arguing
that one cannot deploy an originalist methodology in some cases and not others.
Rather, my point is that a case-by-case decision has a different scope than does a
decision that would range across all cases.
In the choice between originalism and living constitutionalism as general methods
of interpretation, it’s the method or practice (ranging across an action type) and not the
individual decision (or action token) that counts. That general methods of
constitutional interpretation are practices entails that the scope of decision between
such methods cannot be made on a case-by-case basis. These methods compete with ad
hoc pragmatism as a universal method. The decision to be an ad hoc pragmatist
(selecting textualism, originalism, policy argument, etc. as justifications in each case)
has wide or universal scope (within the domain), but given such a method, another
decision of narrow scope (case-by-case) must be made. Rather, the decision whether to
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be a consistent originalist or an ad hoc pragmatist has as its scope of decision the
whole domain of constitutional decisionmaking. 26
Scope of decision interacts with the specification of agency. For an individual
judge, the decision whether constitutional interpretation should be guided by an
originalist methodology is not a feasible choice: one judge (even a very influential
Supreme Court Justice) cannot adopt originalism as a methodology for all the members
of the federal judiciary. The most that individual judges can do is decide to adopt
originalism as a methodology for their own decisions and to attempt to persuade others
to do the same. In the short to medium term, the most that could result from such an
individual decision is a mixed regime with some originalist and some nonoriginalist
decisionmaking. But if the agent is the collectivity of all American judges, then the
adoption of an originalist practice for the whole domain of constitutional
decisionmaking is within the feasible choice set.
G. A Quick and Dirty Guide to the Metaphysics of Modality
Few articles on constitutional theory discuss the metaphysics of modality. 27 Even
the terms “modal” and “modality” may be unfamiliar when they are used, as here, to
refer to ideas about necessity and possibility—although this usage may evoke a dim
recollection that “could” and “must” are called “modal verbs.” If unfamiliarity breeds
contempt, some readers may be skeptical about the value of a philosophical approach
to the modal notions of possibility and necessity for normative constitutional theory. If
you are among such readers, know that I shall ask your indulgence for only a page or
two.
The primary tool that I shall introduce in this section can be called “possible worlds
semantics.” Possible worlds talk translates talk about possibility and necessity into talk
about possible worlds. Begin with the notion of a possible world. 28 This notion is
similar to the notion of a “state of affairs”—which may be familiar from economics.
26. Of course, the content of the practice need not be “pure originalism” or “pure
constitutionalism.” For example, there could be a practice of constitutional interpretation that
incorporated a default rule favoring originalism, but allowed departures from originalism based
on specified criteria. The point is that the scope of the decision to adopt a practice must be
larger than the individual case in order for there to be a practice.
27. But see Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition:
Whose Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 719, 780 (2006); Christopher R.
Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference Distinction, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 555, 566–67
(2006).
28. The idea of possible worlds was introduced by Leibniz. See Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr
von Leibniz, The Theodicy: Abridgement of the Argument Reduced to Syllogistic Form, in
LEIBNIZ: SELECTIONS 509, 509–11 (Philip P. Weiner ed., 1951). Leibniz used the idea of a
possible world in answer to the argument against the existence of good from the problem of
evil. See id. at 511. The argument is not proven, Leibniz maintained, until it is shown that the
actual world is not the best of all possible worlds. Id.; see generally JOHN DIVERS, POSSIBLE
WORLDS (2002) (providing a comprehensive introduction to possible worlds semantics and the
metaphysics of modality); SAUL A. KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (1981) (discussing model
theoretic study of modal logic “possible worlds” semantics); DAVID LEWIS, ON THE PLURALITY
OF WORLDS (1986) (defending modal realism’s view that our world is one of many, each with its
own inhabitants); ALVIN PLANTINGA, ESSAYS IN THE METAPHYSICS OF MODALITY (Matthew
Davidson ed., 2003).
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The philosophical idea of a “possible world” is understood as a complete history of a
whole universe. 29 If some thing is possible, say event X, we say that X occurs in some
possible world. Complimentary to the concept of possibility is the concept of necessity.
Let us say that an event Y is necessary if Y occurs in all possible worlds; a proposition,
p, is a necessary truth if it is true in all possible worlds.
The next step is to add the notion of the “actual world,” where actual is an indexical
term that separates this world from all possible worlds. 30 Thus, an actual constitution
is a constitution that exists in this world. A possible constitution is a constitution that
exists in at least one possible world. A necessary constitution would be a constitution
that exists in all possible worlds. Notice that it seems obvious that there are no
necessary constitutions as there are possible worlds (including the former states of the
actual world) in which there are no constitutions at all. But almost any constitution you
can imagine or conceive is surely possible, 31 because we can posit a possible world in
which that imaginable or conceivable constitution exists.32 Logical possibility requires
only logical consistency, and, in the logical sense, possibility is rarely implicated by
debates in normative legal theory.
Not all possible worlds are implicated in debates about constitutional possibility.
The constitutional possibilities with which we are concerned exist in a subset of all
possible worlds. We can narrow the set of possible worlds that are the domain of
constitutional necessity in a series of steps. Each step can be expressed in terms of the
idea of an accessibility relation. 33 The phrase “accessibility relation” may sound
obscure, but an example will make it crystal clear. For practical purposes, normative
constitutional theory may sometimes only be interested in those worlds that are
possible future states of the actual world. Such worlds share the history of the actual
world up to this moment, and we call worlds that have this property “historically
accessible.” Notice that talk about historical accessibility frequently can be translated
into talk about “path dependency.” The feasible choice set—the future choices that are
possible—may be constrained by history.

29. Sometimes, we may refer to a time slice of a world (either a moment or a period with
definite or indefinite duration) as a possible world. This can be stated differently: a time slice of
one world is itself a distinct possible world—one that comes into being when the time slice
begins and expires when the time slice ends.
30. Examples of indexical terms include “I,” “here,” and “now.” See generally David
Kaplan, Demonstratives, in THEMES FROM KAPLAN 481 (Joseph Almog et al. eds., 1989).
31. Of course, the description of a constitution could be inconsistent and hence that
constitution would not exist in any possible world. The same constitution cannot both include
and not include a counterpart to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. This is
not to say that a constitution with contradictory provisions is impossible: of course, the text of
the constitution could have conflicting deontic requirements.
32. Philosophers debate the question of whether all possible worlds are real or whether the
only real world is the actual world. We shall lay that question aside, and simply talk as if
possible worlds were real. Nothing shall hang on this: our investigation of constitutional
possibility will be neutral between modal realism and ersatz modal realism. See generally
Robert M. Adams, Theories of Actuality, 8 NOÛS 211 (1974); Richard B. Miller, Dog Bites
Man: A Defence of Modal Realism, 67 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 476 (1989); Alexander
Rosenberg, Is Lewis’s ‘Genuine Modal Realism’ Magical Too?, 98 MIND 411 (1989).
33. See LEWIS, supra note 28, at 7–8.
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But “historical accessibility” is not a sufficient limitation for the purposes of
normative constitutional theory. Why not? Because it is logically possible that the
future states of the actual world could be just about anything you can imagine; there is
no logical contradiction in a possible world that shares the history of the world up until
now but in which the United States instantly becomes a parliamentary democracy at
the next snap of Jeremy Waldron’s fingers. For the purposes of normative
constitutional theory, we should restrict the domain of possible worlds to those that
share the basic laws of nature (physics, etc.) with the actual world; these worlds are
called “nomologically accessible.” 34 In nomologically accessible worlds, Waldron’s
finger snaps do not produce constitutional revolutions. The historically and
nomologically accessible worlds, then, are those that share the history of the actual
world up to now and that share our laws of nature.
At this point it is useful to introduce the idea of “distance” between the actual world
and some possible world. Adjacent possible worlds are “close” to the actual world. A
possible world that was just like the actual world—except that this Essay was never
written—would be very close, i.e., adjacent, to the actual world in which the Essay was
written for a conference in early December, 2006. Remote worlds are “distant” from
the actual world. A possible world in which complete essays appear without effort,
simply by snapping one’s fingers would be more remote. Even more distant worlds are
easy to imagine. In ascending degree of remoteness, we can imagine a world in which
the Mongols conquered Europe and the Renaissance did not occur, a world in which
humans never evolved, or a world in which subtle variations in physical laws made the
evolution of carbon-based life impossible.
The constitutional possibilities that concern normative constitutional theory are
primarily those that exist in historically and nomologically accessible possible worlds
that are adjacent to the actual world. 35 One set of accessibility relationships is
especially relevant to constitutional discourse: these relationships concern human
psychology, institutional capacities, social norms, and political attitudes. Some
constitutional options will not work, given what is true about human psychology—they
make unrealistic assumptions about what officials or citizens are capable of doing.
Other constitutional options would require dramatic changes in social norms—their
success relies on unrealistic assumptions about what citizens and officials believe is
acceptable or unacceptable conduct. Some options make counterfactual assumptions
about institutional capacities. And yet other constitutional options are politically
infeasible—they presuppose political attitudes that only exist in possible worlds that
are remote from the actual world. But normative constitutional discourse requires what
we might call “normative space.” That is, normative discourse assumes that minds can
be changed and the attitudes are not entirely fixed. We can call worlds that conform to

34. Id. at 20.
35. For some purposes, however, constitutional theory may wish to investigate questions of
alternative constitutional history. These are “what if” questions. What if Brown v. Board of
Education had been decided the other way? What if The Slaughterhouse Cases hadn’t nullified
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? What if President
Roosevelt had chosen the path of constitutional amendment rather than transformational
appointment to implement the New Deal’s constitutional program? In each case, we imagine a
nomologically accessible possible world that was historically accessible from a prior state of the
actual world.
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the laws of psychology and political science but in which attitudes and beliefs are not
fixed “psychologically and politically accessible worlds.”
Sometimes normative constitutional theory has practical aims—it is concerned with
how we should act in the actual world. Let us call constitutional action in the actual
world “constitutional practice.” 36 Constitutional practice is not concerned with
historically and nomologically accessible possible worlds that cannot come into being
given the limits on human choices. If there is nothing that any agent (individual,
institutional, or collective) does in any historically and nomologically accessible world
that brings a future state of the world about, then the future state is outside the feasible
choice set. Let us call the worlds that are open to human choice in the sense just
specified “practically accessible.” A practically accessible world must be
nomologically and historically accessible through human agency. “Constitutional
practice” is, by stipulation, concerned with possible worlds that are “practically
accessible.”
One final accessibility relation requires a brief mention. We can distinguish
between those worlds that are consistent with our knowledge of the actual world and
those which are inconsistent with such knowledge. We can use the phrase
“epistemologically accessible” to capture this idea. Worlds that are consistent with
everything we know about the actual world are epistemologically accessible. Worlds
that have a feature contradicted by our knowledge of the actual world are
epistemologically inaccessible. Not all epistemologically accessible worlds are
nomologically and historically accessible; there may be historical facts or natural laws
of which we are unaware.
We are now in a position to revisit the idea of a feasible choice set. A claim that a
given constitutional option is outside the feasible choice set is a claim about
constitutional practice, and hence a claim about which possible worlds are practically
accessible. Usually, a claim that a given constitutional option is infeasible will rest
(either explicitly or implicitly) on a claim about human psychology, anthropology,
economics, sociology, or political science.
For example, the claim that a constitutional amendment banning abortion is
politically infeasible, if fully articulated, would rest on claims: (i) about the legal
requirements for constitutional amendments, (ii) about beliefs and desires causally
relevant to the motivations of constitutional actors such as congresspersons and state
legislators, and (iii) about the beliefs and desires of citizens. Thus, the claim might be
that, given the legal requirements, the motives of those whose assent is legally required
for a constitutional amendment, and the attitudes of voters, a constitutional amendment
banning abortion is impossible. In possible worlds talk, we might say that worlds in
which such amendments become law are relatively remote from our own; in these
worlds, political actors behave much differently or many citizens have different
attitudes about abortion or the legal requirements for a constitutional amendment have
been altered. This remoteness is the underlying reason for our judgment that such a
constitutional amendment is outside the feasible choice set.
Constitutional options that exist only in possible worlds that are either historically
or nomologically inaccessible are outside the feasible choice set in a very strong sense.
They cannot come about in a future state of the actual world given the natural laws that

36. This is a stipulated usage. The phrase “constitutional practice” could be used in a
variety of other senses.
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govern this world. Constitutional options that exist in historically and nomologically
accessible worlds may nonetheless be only remote possibilities—they may depend on
changes in beliefs, desires, or institutions that depend on unlikely contingencies. When
such possibilities are sufficiently remote, we may say they are outside the feasible
choice set—but if we speak in this way, we are using “feasibility” in a sense that
diverges from historical and nomological possibility.
At this point, skeptics might ask what value possible worlds semantics adds to
constitutional theory. One answer to this question distinguishes between value that is
added “behind the scenes” and value that is added “on stage.” It seems to me unlikely
that explicit discussion of possible worlds semantics will be required, except in the
rarest of circumstances. One can certainly imagine that constitutional theory informed
by possible worlds semantics might explicitly deploy phrases like “psychologically
impossible” or “outside the politically feasible choice set.” In such cases, the work
done by possible worlds talk would be “behind the scenes”—the ideas can be
expressed without elaborate philosophical machinery. Indeed, in most cases one can
imagine clarity and precision with any explicit use of the philosophical machinery—
even “behind the scenes.” All that is really required is explicit awareness of the
distinctions between the various reasons for impossibility and the explicit
incorporation of these distinctions in the expression of possibility and impossibility
claims.
The role of possible worlds semantics, then, is likely to be limited to the rare case in
which there is a need for a theoretical framework that allows complex, ambiguous, or
vague claims about possibility and impossibility to be made fully explicit. One can
imagine that constitutional theorists might invent such a framework “on the spot,” so to
speak. Or we can imagine that possible worlds semantics would provide a “ready to
hand” set of devices and distinctions that would enable theorizing about constitutional
possibility to gain maximum clarity and precision with a minimum of intellectual
effort.
H. A Very Short Introduction to Positive Constitutional Theory
So far, the investigation of constitutional possibility has been entirely conceptual.
But claims about which options are inside or outside of the feasible choice set are
claims in positive constitutional theory; that is, they are claims about the beliefs,
desires, and attitudes as well as the laws of human psychology, sociology, and political
science that govern those human actions that enable constitutional possibilities. The
social and human sciences are, of course, a vast topic—even for a very short
introduction. Nonetheless, a very brief mapping of the territory is possible.
We can begin with the dominant (and allegedly most successful) tool for the
explanation of human and social behavior, which at a very high level of abstraction can
be called “rational choice theory.” 37 The basic assumption of rational choice theory is
that individual humans act rationally—where rationality is defined in terms of the
relationship between beliefs, desires, and actions. An action is rational if it is an action

37. See, e.g., RATIONAL CHOICE (Jon Elster ed., 1986) (collecting essays on rational choice
as a methodology for the social sciences). But see DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO,
PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
(1996).
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that would satisfy the agent’s desires (or preferences) given the agent’s beliefs (the
information available to the agent). The most familiar example of rational choice
theory is neoclassical microeconomics, and another important form is game theory. 38
As applied to the political domain, rational choice theory is expressed as “positive
political theory” and “public choice theory.” 39 For example, the question whether a
given constitutional amendment could pass (or a nominee for the Supreme Court could
be confirmed) can be addressed via a formal model of voting behavior in the House,
the Senate, and the various state legislatures.40 Such a model might assume that each
member of these legislative bodies has a set of policy preferences that can be expressed
as a position on a real line (from right to left) in ideological space. Whether a statute
will pass depends on the median voter in the legislature—since the majority rule makes
the vote of the legislator who occupies the median position on the ideology line the
critical vote. Similarly, whether a given constitutional amendment would pass could
depend on whether the critical voter in the House, the Senate, and the critical voter in
all houses of legislatures constituting two-thirds of the total number of states, would
view the state of affairs that would obtain after the amendment was passed
(represented as a point on the ideology line) as an improvement over the status quo
(also represented as a point on the line). This model might be grounded in a more basic
explanation of legislator behavior in terms of their preferences for gaining and
retaining office—or by some other model of rational action by legislators. Typically,
rational choice theories (including positive political theory and public choice theory)
are expressed in formal models, although such models may also be explicated
informally or through precise analysis of the conceptual content of the claims made by
the models.
Rational choice theory has rivals and variants. For example, recent work in
behavioral economics emphasizes cognitive mechanisms that may produce behavior
that traditional rational choice theory would label irrational. 41 Another approach
emphasizes the role of causal mechanisms or microfoundations in the social sciences.42
One strand of the sociological tradition emphasizes the functional role that institutions
and other social phenomena may play in producing social stability or cohesion.
Marxist explanations might describe the limits on constitutional possibility in terms of
the functional role of law in relationship to class interests. 43 Less formally, the limits
of constitutional possibility might be described by stories or historical narratives that

38. See, e.g., DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY (1991).
39. See generally WILLIAM H. RIKER & P.C. ORDERSNOOK, INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE
POLITICAL THEORY (1972) (discussing positive political theory). For a discussion of public
choice theory, there are several good choices available. See generally DUNCAN BLACK, THE
THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS (1958); JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK,
THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
(1965).
40. See David S. Law & Lawrence B. Solum, Judicial Selection, Appointments Gridlock,
and the Nuclear Option, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 51 (2006).
41. See, e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
42. See, e.g., SOCIAL MECHANISMS: AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO SOCIAL THEORY (Peter
Hedström & Richard Swedberg eds., 1998); JON ELSTER, NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES (1989).
43. See G.A. COHEN, KARL MARX'S THEORY OF HISTORY: A DEFENCE (1992).
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identify the motives and beliefs of particular constitutional actors or groups of such
actors. Comparative constitutionalism and constitutional history offer additional tools;
constitutional possibilities may be established by pointing to constitutional models in
other societies or in our own history.
Social science can provide the tools for systematic and rigorous discussion of
constitutional possibility in the service of normative constitutional theory, but such
tools might be deployed in various ways to undermine or criticize normativity. In an
extreme form, rational choice theory or its alternatives can be deployed in a
reductionist or eliminativist program. That is, normative constitutional theory can itself
be explained as rational, self-interested behavior or as an ideology that serves the
interests of the ruling class. 44 The most extreme version of such reductionism might
characterize normative constitutional theory as mere “cheap talk” or as the post hoc
rationalization of constitutional politics that is driven entirely by interests or forces
outside the realm of normative theory. Positive constitutional theory might swallow
normativity in another way, by making claims about constitutional determinism—the
thesis that constitutional actors lack “free will” and hence that our constitutional fate is
preordained.
As a practical matter, normative constitutional theory assumes the viability of
libertarian or compatabilist views about constitutional choice. 45 The intellectual
division of labor among these disciplines assumes that normative constitutional
theorists are entitled to get on with the business of evaluating constitutional choices;
the deep questions posed by reductionism and determinism are properly deferred to
other disciplines, theorists, and occasions.
The point of this brief survey of positive constitutional theory is simply to suggest
constitutional theorists can access a wide variety of tools for arguing about
constitutional possibility. These tools range from the formal, game-theoretic work of
positive political theorists to the informal, narrative, and historical efforts of new
institutionalists. All of these approaches provide models for developing claims about
constitutional possibilities that go beyond hand waving and mere assertion.
I. Why a Toolkit and Not a Theory?
We need to address (albeit briefly) another set of issues before we move on. Why
provide a toolkit for thinking about constitutionality possibility and not a theory of
constitutional possibility? Would the systematic and conceptual unity of a theory
provide a surer cure for the ills of confusion, ambiguity, and inconsistency?
Perhaps, but there are at least two reasons for offering a toolkit rather than a theory.
The first reason is that the topics of feasibility and possibility are relatively unexplored
in legal theory in general and constitutional theory in particular. A theory produced
after the issues have been made explicit and digested seems more likely to have lasting
value than would a theory introduced at such an early stage of development. The
second reason for preferring a toolkit to a theory is that it is at least “possible” that a

44. For an illuminating discussion, see generally Brian Leiter, Morality Critics, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY (Brian Leiter & M. Rosen eds., 2007).
45. DAVID DENNETT, ELBOW ROOM: VARIETIES OF FREE WILL WORTH WANTING (1984);
Michael McKenna, Compatibilism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, Apr. 26, 2004,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/.
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toolkit is all we need. Thinking about legal or constitutional possibilities may not
require an elaborate theory that applies to the entire range of modal issues in
constitutional discourse. For example, possible worlds semantics may illuminate a few
thorny problems but simply not be worth the intellectual overhead for most discussions
of constitutional possibility. In some contexts, we might be fully satisfied with the idea
of constitutional second best combined with a careful explanation of what variable is
constrained and why. In other contexts, it might be the distinction between ideal and
nonideal theory that would do the required work. For both reasons, this essay eschews
a general theory and offers instead a toolkit.
II. AVOIDING THREE CONCEPTUAL ERRORS
With our conceptual toolkit in place, we can now examine three fundamental errors
that might confuse our thinking about possibility. The first error is to reduce possibility
to cost. The second error is to infer that the conceivability of a choice or outcome
entails its practical possibility. The third error is to equate possibility with probability.
Each of these errors can and should be avoided.
A. The Error of Reducing Possibility to Cost
Positive and normative law and economics provide powerful frameworks for
thinking about the law and policy. Part of that power derives from a focus on costs and
benefits. Frequently, we can understand and predict behavior by focusing on the
expected costs and benefits of alternative actions. Sometimes, the action that is morally
best is the action that accrues the greatest benefits or minimizes costs. If carried to an
extreme, this focus on costs and benefits might lead to the conclusion that talk about
possibility and feasibility can be reduced to talk about costs. We might come to believe
that the sentence, “Outcome A is impossible,” can be reduced to, “Outcome A is too
costly to be seriously considered.” Or “Choice B is not feasible,” might be equivalent
to “Choice B is so costly that it should not be considered as an alternative.”
Possibility cannot be reduced to cost for several reasons. First, some kinds of
impossibility are unrelated to cost (in even the broadest sense of that term). The
number of Senators apportioned to each state cannot simultaneously be equal and
proportionate to population; given unequal population size, this would be a logical
impossibility. Second, the attribution of costs to options is dependent upon a prior
notion of possibility. Thus, if we say that option A entails the accrual of cost n, that
assertion depends on the prior assumption that a state of affairs in which option A is
chosen, but cost n is not accrued is not a possible state. Third, even when costs play a
causal role in establishing impossibility, agent relativity differentiates between costs as
factors to be weighed in decisionmaking and costs that make certain outcomes
practically impossible. For example, if respecting the freedom of speech is costly in
cases involving advocacy of terrorism, the Supreme Court (as a relevant constitutional
agent) might take that fact into account. And in some circumstances, high costs might
lead the court to view a given constitutional rule as “infeasible.” But this is quite
different from the court reaching the conclusion that compliance with a rule would be
impossible, because the costs associated with compliance would be too large for the
affected governmental entity to bear. In the first case, the costs are factors to be
weighed in making the decision. In the second case, the costs are causal influences that
determine which outcomes are possible from the point of view of the Court.
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B. The Error of Inferring Practical Possibility from Conceivability
The relationship between conceivability and possibility is complex and much
debated, 46 but for the purposes of normative legal theory the important question
concerns the relationship between conceivability and practical possibility. Sometimes,
impossibility assertions are cast in terms of inconceivability. For example, one might
say, “It is inconceivable that the United States Supreme Court would overrule Brown v.
Board of Education.” 47 In some cases, inconceivability does imply practical
impossibility. If none of the Supreme Court Justices can imagine overruling Brown v.
Board and if the action must be conceived as a possibility before it can be performed,
then inconceivability entails a certain kind of impossibility. The action is impossible
until it is imagined; it then becomes possible in the sense that it is “on the table” or
“open for discussion.” But it is a mistake to run the inference in the opposite direction.
Conceivability does not entail practical possibility. That is because, practical
possibility is always contingent upon a variety of factors that are not causally
dependent upon conceivability. For example, a Supreme Court Justice might have
imagined that the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board would have resulted in
immediate compliance, but imagining would neither make it so nor make it practically
possible for it to be so.
The point of this discussion is that conceivability and practical possibility may be
related, but they are not identical. When both matter to a particular discussion, each
should be analyzed on its own terms and the relationship between the two concepts
should be made explicit.
C. The Error of Equating Possibility and Probability
Another tempting error is to equate possibility and probability. Possibility is
normally understood as a binary function. An action, outcome, or event is either
possible or impossible—once we specify the “sense of possibility” or, more
technically, the accessibility relationships that define the relevant set of possible
worlds. Probability, however, is a scalar: a given outcome may be “more or less likely”
or, more formally, its probability may assume any real value from 0 to 1. The tempting
mistake is to equate “possible” with “probability greater than zero” and “impossible”
with “probability equal to zero.” Given this move, an even more serious error becomes
tempting: one might then say that assertions of “impossibility” are actually assertions
of “extreme improbability,” with the consequence that the concept of impossibility
would turn out to be confused or mistaken.
But the equation of possibility and probability is, in fact, based on conceptual
confusion. The nature of the error is easiest to see in the case of logical possibility. It
simply does not make sense to assert that it is merely improbable that the following
two statements are both true: (1) this article was written entirely in the twenty-first
century, and (2) this article was not written entirely in the twenty-first century. It is

46. See CONCEIVABILITY AND POSSIBILITY (Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorn eds.,
2002).
47. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional
Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 744–45 (1988).
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logically impossible that both statements are true, and the concept of improbability has
no application to this kind of case. If someone were to assert the following: “The
probability of both statements being true is zero,” we would understand that they were
using probability in a figurative or metaphorical sense. There may be cases where
“impossible” means “probability of zero,” but not all cases are like this. In some cases,
talk of probabilities is simply inappropriate.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL POSSIBILITIES
What are the implications of a richer understanding of constitutional possibility for
constitutional theory and practice? This question can be answered in two different
ways. First, we can examine the general implications of constitutional possibility for
normative theory, and second, we can formulate standards for making sound arguments
about constitutional possibilities and necessities.
A. Implications for Normative Constitutional Theory
A systematic investigation of constitutional possibility has some direct implications
for normative constitutional theory. Let’s begin with the most basic point—ought
implies can.
1. Ought Implies Can and the Possibility of Collective Action
The maxim “ought implies can” is associated with Immanuel Kant,48 and according
to one interpretation the maxim authorizes an inference from an “ought proposition”
(expressing an obligation) to a modal assertion that it is possible to do the action which
ought to be done. The conventional understanding interprets the “implies” in “ought
implies can” to mean that “if a given action, x, is not possible, then that action is not
obligatory.” 49 Thus, no one can be obligated to do the impossible: humans are not
obligated to perform miracles. Of course, whether “ought” does, in fact, imply “can”
will depend on what we mean by “ought” and in what sense we mean “can.” Consider
the following: “I am not obligated to do my duty to keep my promise, because I simply
cannot bring myself to do anything unpleasant.” Inability in that sense is not excusing.
In context, the idea is that our practical constitutional obligations are constrained by
our practical constitutional possibilities. At that level of abstraction, “constitutional
ought implies constitutional can,” is likely to gain wide assent. But agreement is likely
to break down once problems of cooperation and group versus individual agency are
introduced. Are we obligated to lend our support to just efforts to amend a wicked
constitution, even if we believe that such attempts are doomed to fail? And this
question is different than the question whether we are obligated to amend a wicked

48. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 30 (Mary J.
Gregor ed. & trans., 1996); see also STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT:
MORALITY, RESPECT, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 33 (2006); Paul Guyer, Immanuel Kant (1724–
1804): Freedom of the Will and the Highest Good, in ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY, Feb. 29, 2004, http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/DB047SECT11.
49. O(x) # P(x) $ %P(x)#%O(x), which can be parsed as “x is obligatory implies that x
is possible if and only if x is not possible implies that x is not obligatory.”
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constitution when we have no power or means to do so. And both of these questions
are different from a third: do we have an obligation to vote for an amendment to a
wicked constitution that is before us, even though we know that the amendment will
not pass?
Consider the following hypothetical example: suppose that there is a historically
and nomologically accessible world with a better constitution for the United States—a
constitution without equal suffrage for the states, without an electoral college, with
provisions for the removal of incompetent presidents and judges, and so forth. Relative
to some collective agent (e.g., “We the People” or “Congress and the state
legislatures”), radical constitutional change is a practical possibility. Assume that
relative to any individual agent, extensive revision or replacement of the Constitution
is a practical impossibility. Hypothetically, nothing that I can do will bring about a
constitutional amendment—and therefore (it could be argued), I have no obligation of
political morality even to attempt to bring about such a change: in historically and
nomologically accessible possible worlds, my attempt will be futile. In the
hypothesized scenario, even the most powerful individual actors (e.g., the Speaker of
the House or the Senate Majority Leader) cannot act so as to create a significant
probability that a constitutional amendment would actually become law. 50
What are our constitutional obligations given this hypothetical (but not unrealistic)
case? The hypothetical assumes that we can attempt constitutional reform, but our
attempt cannot (or with an overwhelming probability, will not) succeed. Does the
impossibility of success excuse participation in the movement for reform? If
impossibility excuses, what about improbability? The point of raising these questions
is to expose the ambiguities and disagreements that lie behind assent to the abstract
proposition that ought implies can.
These issues are deep ones, and similar issues are familiar from debates in moral
theory. 51 If they are resolvable, this is not the occasion for their resolution. The very
modest point of raising them is to emphasize the need for normative constitutional
theory to be clear about agency and possibility in making claims about constitutional
obligation. Claims that the existing constitutional order falls short of the constitution of
ideal theory are one thing; claims that individuals or institutions have violated an
obligation of political morality by failing to cooperate in a program of constitutional
reform or revolution are another.
To the extent that arguments within normative constitutional theory implicitly rest
on “ought implies can,” clarity may require specification of two things: (1) the identity

50. There may be “critical junctures” at which individual action would become obligatory.
See generally RUTH BERINS COLLIER & DAVID COLLIER, SHAPING THE POLITICAL ARENA (2d ed.
2002) (explaining the idea of “critical juncture”).
51. For example, rule-utilitarians and act-utilitarians may disagree over the obligations to
perform actions that will not be effective given that, in the actual world, others may not
cooperate in the creation of a good or the avoidance of an evil. Act-consequentialism makes the
rightness of an action dependent on the consequences of the individual action, whereas ideal
rule-consequentialism focuses on the consequences of actual compliance with a system of rules.
See generally BRAD HOOKER, IDEAL CODE, REAL WORLD (2000) (articulating ruleconsequentialism and contrasting it with act-consequentialism). Similarly, deontological moral
theories may prohibit actions that violate the moral rights of others, even if the consequence of a
given agent refraining from the prohibited action is that some other person will commit the
wrong.
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of the agents addressed by the arguments, and (2) the underlying theory of the political
morality of individual action that requires cooperation for efficacy. The alternative to
this kind of specificity is to invite confusion and misunderstanding.
2. Ideal Theory Distinguished from Bad Utopianism
Ideal theory has an important role to play in normative constitutional theory. Ideal
theory is arguably part of an intrinsically valuable activity—the discovery of normative
truths—even if that activity does not or cannot change constitutional practice.
Moreover, ideal theory may provide ideas, arguments, and standards that are relevant
to nonideal theory. For example, it might be the case that the constitution of ideal
theory would provide the telos, or goal, that constitutional practice should strive to
achieve.
But ideal theory should be distinguished from what might be called “bad
utopianism”—a theoretical practice that relies on false assumptions about human
nature or institutional capacities in order to argue for constitutional arrangements that
exist only in nomologically inaccessible worlds. Recall that in the Rawlsian sense,
ideal theory makes idealizing assumptions about compliance, but it does not make
counterfactual assumptions about the limits of human or institutional capacities. This is
not to say that a given ideal theory could not exemplify bad utopianism. For example, a
normative constitutional theory might seek to establish the practical normative
significance of an ideal constitution, but fail to acknowledge that the ideal’s
attractiveness rested on an assumption of perfect compliance that is inconsistent with
actual human nature—an example of what I call “bad utopianism.” 52
3. The Best of All Possible Constitutions, Comparative Constitutionalism, and
Constitutional Second Bests
The question whether either ideal theory or a constitutional model exemplified in
another society should provide the normative standard for actual constitutional practice
is strongly connected to the ideas about path dependency and the constitutional second
best. Consider two ideas: (1) because of path dependency, constitutional comparisons
are insufficient to establish practical possibility, and (2) the constitutional second best
may not be the closest approximation to the best of all possible constitutions. These
two ideas can be fleshed out in the context of an example—the case for parliamentary
democracy as a constitutional ideal.
Let’s suppose for the sake of argument that the best of all possible constitutions
would be a parliamentary democracy with an institutional structure that approximates
that which exists in the United Kingdom—but without a dodgy royal family. The case
for this constitution might rest on the idea that democratic governance is justified by

52. This is not to say that something similar to “bad utopianism” could never play a
constructive role in normative constitutional theory. By making wildly implausible or
counterfactual assumptions about human nature, we might illuminate the underlying reasons for
certain normative conclusions. For example, we might assume executive perfection and argue
that given that assumption, there would be no need for a constitutional requirement of due
process. That thought experiment might then illuminate why due process is required in the
actual world.
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considerations of equality and deliberative autonomy and that the parliamentary form
does the best job of protecting these basic liberties. From the premise that
parliamentary democracy is first best, one might argue that incremental changes in the
actual Constitution of the United States should move constitutional practice in the
direction of this model. For example, it might be argued that the direct election of
Senators (as provided by the Seventeenth Amendment) was justified, because it moved
the United States Constitution in the direction of the parliamentary model. 53 The “real
world” feasibility and desirability of the parliamentary model might be established by
comparative constitutional analysis—pointing to the United Kingdom and other
parliamentary democracies as models.
But granting the premise that parliamentary democracy is the key feature of the best
of all possible constitutions and that comparative analysis establishes its feasibility, it
does not follow that incremental changes that move in the direction of the
parliamentary model are normatively justified. First, it is not necessarily the case that
the feasible choice set includes the establishment of a parliamentary democracy in the
United States—except in the very long run or in the cases of a catastrophic
constitutional crisis. For example, it might be the case that no constitutional
amendment abolishing equal suffrage of the States in the Senate could gain the assent
of three-quarters of the state legislatures; moreover, Article V of the Constitution
purports to insulate equal suffrage in the Senate from change by amendment. 54 If
parliamentary democracy is outside the feasible choice set, then moves in that direction
cannot be justified as steps on the path towards the ideal. Second, it is not necessarily
the case that the constitutional second best for the United States is the closest possible
approximation of parliamentary democracy. The constitutional second best might be
even more distant from parliamentary democracy than the status quo: for example, it is
conceivable that more vigorous judicial supervision of policy would counteract the
Senate’s anti-majoritarian structure in ways that systematically produced better
outcomes than the more “parliamentary” alternative—a highly deferential practice of
judicial review.
B. Standards for Modal Constitutional Arguments
“Modal constitutional arguments” are arguments about constitutional possibilities—
about what constitutional actions and events are possible or necessary. What are the
implications of our investigation of constitutional possibility for sound arguments of
this sort?
1. The Criteria for Modal Claims Should Be Articulated
Claims about constitutional possibility and necessity are ambiguous. For example,
the claim that a given constitutional action or event is “impossible” is almost never a
claim about logical possibility, but the precise nature of the modal claim is rarely
specified. When that lacuna is combined with a failure to specify the relevant agent
and scope of decision, there is a good chance of misunderstanding and confusion.

53. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII; see also United States Senate, Direct Election of Senators,
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Direct_Election_Senators.htm.
54. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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The remedy is the articulation of criteria for modal claims. In what sense is a given
constitutional action or event possible or impossible, feasible or infeasible? In
particular, it is important for constitutional impossibility claims to make it clear
whether the claim is based on path dependency (historical accessibility), facts about
human nature or institutional capacity (nomological accessibility), or the existing
attitudes, beliefs, and desires of constitutionally relevant agents.
Meeting the articulation standard will require more precision than is usually found
in contemporary constitutional theory and practice, but it does not require any
particular vocabulary. Possible worlds semantics provides a convenient and precise
vocabulary, but the resources of ordinary English provide sufficient resources for full
articulation of claims about the possibility or impossibility of constitutional options.
All that is required is that modal claims be stated in locutions like “This is impossible
in the sense that . . .” or “The practicality possibility of this proposal depends on . . . .”
2. The Evidence for Impossibility Claims Should Be Stated
Claims about constitutional possibility are sometimes made without supporting
evidence. Of course, claims that a given constitutional option is either possible or
impossible do not always require evidence—some things are obvious and
uncontroversial. But when a normative constitutional claim rests on the assertion that
an alternative option is impossible or infeasible, discourse will be improved if evidence
for the assertion is made explicit. Once the evidence is on the table, it is subject to
scrutiny and possible refutation. Moreover, there is no general or a priori reason to
believe that impossibility claims do not require evidence. And the claim that a given
constitutional option is outside the feasible choice set may turn out to be controversial
and contestable.
3. Double Standards Should Be Avoided
Finally and importantly, arguments about constitutional possibility should avoid
double standards. That is, if one argues against a constitutional alternative on the
ground that it is outside the feasible choice set, then one is obligated to show that the
preferred option or options are inside the set—on the basis of the same criteria and in
light of available evidence.
The possibility of a constitutional double standard can be illustrated by reference to
a hypothetical dispute between advocates of constitutional originalism and Dworkin’s
view of law as integrity. 55 Originalists might claim that their approach is superior
because it provides objective standards for correct constitutional interpretation. A
Dworkinian might attempt to refute this claim by arguing actual judges are incapable
of discerning the original public meaning of the Constitution; in the actual world, the
argument might go, judges and justices lack both the historical chops and the capacity
to set aside their own preferences. But if the Dworkinian (or quasi-Dworkinian) were
then to appeal to Dworkin’s ideal judge, Hercules, when the feasibility of law as
integrity was assessed, a double standard would have been imposed. 56 In the actual

55. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
56. The example is illustrative and not intended as a criticism of Dworkin himself. Dworkin
knows that Hercules is an idealization and not a role model.
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world, the same judges who lack historical chops may lack Hercules’s capacity to
construct the theory that best fits and justifies the law as a whole; in the actual world,
the same biases that distort originalist judges could distort the method of law as
integrity. Of course, we can easily imagine that the tables are turned and that it is the
originalists who deploy a double standard.
IV. TWO CASE STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL POSSIBILITY
A. Levinson on Structural Constitutional Reform
In his recent book, Our Undemocratic Constitution, Sandy Levinson argues that the
United States Constitution suffers from grievous structural defects. 57 These defects
include: (1) the allocation of power to the Senate in which representatives of a
substantial minority of citizens hold a majority of votes; (2) the very high probability
that a presidential dictatorship would follow a catastrophic attack on members of
Congress; (3) too much power for the President; (4) the Electoral College, which
permits the election of Presidents by a minority of voters; (5) the long period that lame
duck Presidents and Congresses serve; (6) the limitation of impeachment to high
crimes and misdemeanors and the absence of a mechanism for removal of the President
on grounds of incompetency; (7) the functional impossibility of constitutional
amendment. 58 But are solutions to these grievous ills possible? This question has
special urgency because Levinson’s indictment of Article V rests fundamentally on the
claim that constitutional amendments are functionally impossible.
One of the most interesting features of Levinson’s indictment of “our undemocratic
Constitution” is the role that modal claims play in his argument. In an important sense,
the “functional impossibility” of amending the Constitution through Article V is an
essential assumption for all of the constitutional failures that Levinson identifies. If
Article V were adequately responsive to democratic pressures, then the other problems
could be fixed, but given the “functional impossibility of amendment,” changes to fix
grievous flaws (such as the continuity of government problem) face enormous
obstacles—even though no entrenched political interests would be threatened.
Levinson’s idea of “functional impossibility” is not theorized, but it is possible to
reconstruct his argument. The relevant agent to whom the functional impossibility
claim applies is something like “a national democratic majority.” The agent is a
majority, because Levinson is explicitly worried about the inability of majorities to
amend the Constitution. The agent is not “We the People” as a collectivity, because
supermajorities can amend the Constitution. What accessibility relationships would
cash out Levinson’s “functional impossibility”? It seems clear that Levinson is dealing
with historically and nomologically accessible possible worlds; and that his notion of
what is “functionally possible” is based on an implicit positive theory about the
attitudes and beliefs that motivate the constitutional actors who are formally
empowered to propose and ratify constitutional amendments.
Levinson argues that some of the Constitution’s defects can be corrected through
constitutional amendments passed through ordinary political processes; for example,
the problem of continuity in government in the event of a catastrophic attack on

57. LEVINSON, supra note 4, at 167.
58. Id.
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Congress could be corrected by a constitutional amendment that could garner the
support of current or future members of Congress and state legislatures.59 This portion
of his argument is based on the idea that some amendments are difficult but not
impossible.
When it comes to the most significant structural defects—for example, the equal
suffrage of large and small states in the Senate, Levinson is quite frank that remedies
through ordinary political mechanisms are infeasible. As Levinson puts it, “It may
seem almost frivolous to suggest ordinary politics is the way to correct these
defects.” 60 Even if Senators from large states attempted to form a coalition that would
lobby for a constitutional amendment, the incentives provided by the institutional
structure of the Senate would provide powerful incentives for logrolling as usual. 61 In
other words, Levinson does a very credible job of articulating the criteria for
feasibility, providing evidence for his claims, and he explicitly acknowledges the need
to avoid double standards. 62
So what is the solution? Again, Levinson’s frankness is admirable—he is adamant
that his suggestions be treated as the start of a conversation and not as definitive
answers to the problem of constitutional possibility. 63 The core of his tentative
suggestion is collective action by individual citizens, starting with conversations
among friends and neighbors, progressing to grass roots organizing, and proceeding to
a petition drive for a new constitutional convention. 64 If petitions directed at Congress
fail, Levinson suggests citizen lobbying of state legislatures—triggering the Article V
procedure for calling a constitutional convention in response to a petition from twothirds of the state legislatures. 65
What are we to make of this proposal? Is a mass movement for wholesale
constitutional reform really feasible? Of course, there is one sense in which it is
obvious that such a movement is feasible. The collective agent that consists of “We the
People,” the citizenry of the United States, could engage in the actions that Levinson
describes. But Levinson cannot consistently focus on this collective agent as the
solution to his problem. Why not? Because for “We the People,” Article V does not
make constitutional amendments a “functional impossibility.” If “We the People” are
the relevant agent, then constitutional amendments are within the feasible choice set.
So, Levinson cannot appeal to collective agency as the solution to the problem of
constitutional possibility without employing a double standard.
In order to avoid a double standard of constitutional possibility, Levinson can (and
seemingly does) appeal to citizens as individuals. Implicitly, Levinson seems to make
the (seemingly plausible) assumption that the structural defects in the Constitution are
sufficiently serious that they could motivate many individuals to act. Thus, he suggests
that individual citizens might purchase and share his book as a very preliminary step
towards the creation of a mass movement. But this solution has obvious problems—
problems of collective action that are familiar to economists and political scientists.
59. Id. at 168–69.
60. Id. at 169.
61. Id. at 171–72.
62. Id. at 171 (“Given the central thesis of this book, it would be almost self-contradictory
to say that the remedy to our most basic ills lies in ordinary politics.”).
63. Id. at 172.
64. Id. at 172–73.
65. Id. at 173–74.
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One way to frame the collective action problem that Levinson’s solution faces is to
ask the following question: do I have an obligation of political morality to participate
in such a movement? The structure of the choice situation is conventionally captured
by the game theoretic analysis of prisoner’s dilemmas and free rider problems. Let’s
take a very simple version of the problem. Suppose that I have two options. Option one
is to join the democratic constitution movement in its current early and informal phase
by purchasing and distributing several copies of Levinson’s book, participating in
meetings about its ideas, and writing letters to my Senators and Representatives urging
them to introduce and support several constitutional amendments. Option two is to
expend these resources on another project (which might be efforts in support of the
Global Fund and Oxfam but could just as well be writing a book or reading a few
dozen novels). Suppose that I reason as follows: if there is sufficient political support
for Levinson’s program, then my efforts have a vanishingly small chance of making
the difference between success and failure, but if there isn’t sufficient political support,
then my efforts will be ineffectual. In either case, I will incur significant opportunity
costs by investing time and resources in the democratic constitution movement.
Therefore, it would be irrational for me to join the movement.
One solution to collective action problems of this sort is an agreement—making the
cooperation of each contingent upon the cooperation of a group sufficient to bring
about (or make more likely) the desired consequence. Perhaps, Levinson could
establish a website that would enable me to pledge to take various actions in support of
the movement which would be triggered by numerical thresholds. I would pledge to go
discuss Levinson’s ideas with at least two friends if 100 other citizens would do so as
well. I would pledge to purchase and distribute ten copies of Levinson’s book, when at
least 1,000 other citizens had made that pledge. I would pledge to use meetup.com to
organize a local meeting on the democratic constitution movement, when at least
10,000 other citizens had made a similar pledge. I would pledge to attend a mass rally
when at least 100,000 other citizens had made a similar pledge.66
There are familiar problems with agreements of this sort; for example, monitoring
compliance with the agreement would be costly, creating a secondary collective action
problem. Compliance is crucial, because the decision whether to comply with the
agreement presents the same kind of collective action problem as does cooperation in
the absence of an agreement. One can imagine, however, the deployment of
inexpensive mechanisms for monitoring compliance; self-reporting of compliance is
likely to be reasonably accurate, and there might be reasons to believe that modest
defection from the agreement would be consistent with the rationality of general
compliance. My commitment of each additional increment of resources would be
conditional on the success of the prior stage, so the opportunity costs would become
more substantial only after the likelihood of overcoming the collective action problem
became more significant: success in the early stages would provide evidence that
success at later stages was feasible. At some point, the number of participants would
reach a level where the commitment of resources by each individual member of the
movement would decline. Once there were a few million members, then a few email

66. These examples are purely illustrative. I do not mean to suggest that agreements like
this would actually be endorsed by the requisite numbers or that these agreements would result
in action, even if they were executed.
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messages to one’s representatives in Congress and the state legislature (plus a modest
donation to the Democratic Constitution Alliance) would be sufficient.
Is this story plausible? Recent experience with political organization via the Internet
suggests that it is not wholly implausible. The limited success of Howard Dean’s
presidential campaign and the continued ability of moveon.org to raise significant
funds provide evidence that the low cost of transacting over the Internet can change the
dynamic of grass roots political organizing. 67 In the first phase of this campaign, the
only member of the movement would be Levinson himself, and the opportunity costs
for his continued involvement after publication of his book could be substantial indeed.
In the next phase, concerted effort by a small group would be required in order to
establish the infrastructure for a mass movement. No one is likely to claim that such a
movement will necessarily succeed. A more likely assessment is that a movement for
wholesale constitutional reform has only a slim possibility of success. But if a mass
movement for constitutional reform does have a practical possibility of success, then
the same technique might work to enable constitutional amendments on other topics
through the normal Article V process—undercutting Levinson’s claim that such
amendments are a functional impossibility.
My discussion of the speculative possibilities is even more tentative than
Levinson’s, and my point is not to advocate for, or against, such a movement or to
claim that such a movement is inside, or outside, the feasible choice set. Rather, my
very limited ambition is to attempt to deploy some of the available tools to frame the
discussion in a way that points towards a rigorous, coherent, and consistent discussion
of constitutional possibility.
B. Scalia on the Case for Originalism
Disclaimers first. This section of the essay investigates constitutional possibility in
the context of United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia’s argument for
originalism as made in his famous essay Orginalism: The Lesser Evil. 68 It makes no
claim about originalism in general or Scalia’s jurisprudence as developed in
subsequent writings. 69 This is a case study of the way that constitutional possibility is
deployed in academic legal discourse, and not an argument against (or for) originalism
(or nonoriginalism) on the merits. In addition, the discussion that follows will consider
several different interpretations of Scalia’s claims about possibility in his essay. Some
of these interpretations are implausible as reconstructions of Scalia’s own views, but
that is not the purpose for which they are offered. Rather, the point of the discussion
that follows is to comprehensively explore the claims that Scalia might have made
about constitutional possibilities. Our aim is to understand the modality in
constitutional discourse and not to assess the ultimate merits of Scalia’s argument.

67. See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, Fund-Raising Puts Dean in Top Tier of Contenders, N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 2003, at 16.
68. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
69. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1998); see also BARNETT, supra note
2; Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999); Lawrence
B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and
the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155 (2006).
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Finally, this discussion of Scalia’s argument will not differentiate between different
forms of originalism. 70
With those caveats out of the way, let’s take a look at the way that possibility
figures into Scalia’s argument for originalism:
[T]he central practical defect of nonoriginalism is fundamental and irreparable: the
impossibility of achieving any consensus on what, precisely, is to replace original
meaning, once that is abandoned. 71

Thus, an impossibility claim is at the very heart of Scalia’s case for originalism as “the
lesser evil”: the impossibility of achieving consensus on an alternative to original
meaning is the “central practical defect of nonoriginalism.”
But what claim did Scalia make? Scalia’s statement is brief and enigmatic. The
phrase, “the impossibility of achieving consensus,” fails to specify a sense of
impossibility, the agent or agents for whom achieving consensus is impossible, and so
forth. In order to assess Scalia’s claim, we need to unpack it, sorting out the various
meanings that Scalia might have intended.
On one interpretation, which we can call the “conceptual interpretation,” Scalia’s
argument seems to suffer an obvious defect. Scalia divides the set of constitutional
theories into two subsets: originalist and nonoriginalist. He then argues that the defect
of the set of nonoriginalist theories is that it is impossible for them to form a consensus
on what is to replace originalism; this defect is obviously not present in originalism,
which by definition is able to form a consensus on originalism itself. If we interpret
Scalia as making a conceptual claim, then his argument is sound (valid with true
premises), but trivial. The members of the subset of originalist theories are, by
definition, originalist. The members of the subset of nonoriginalist theories are, as a
matter of fact and definition, different from one another—their only common
characteristic is that they are nonoriginalist. Brennan’s “living constitutionalism” is
different from Dworkin’s “law as integrity.”72 Given the way that Scalia has drawn the
lines and the fact that nonoriginalist theories differ from one another, “consensus”
among them is logically impossible. 73 This argument is trivial, because it can be made
on behalf of any constitutional theory. For example, if we divide constitutional theories
into Dworkinian and non-Dworkinian theories, it is impossible for the non-Dworkinian
theories to form a consensus. So this cannot be the kind of impossibility claim that
Scalia is making—at least if we are to interpret him charitably.
How else might we interpret Scalia’s impossibility claim? Scalia might be claiming
that it is impossible for some set of judges (the current bench or perhaps the politically

70. Among the forms of originalism that have played a prominent role in recent discussions
are “original intentions” and “original meaning.” See Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory
Lexicon 019: Originalism, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/01/legal_
theory_le_1.html (Jan. 18, 2004).
71. Scalia, supra note 68, at 862–63.
72. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 55; William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the
United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 438 (1986).
73. That is, it is logically impossible for different constitutional theories to be identical to
one another. Scalia cannot charitably be interpreted as making the much stronger claim that
there is no possible world in which there is one and only one nonoriginalist theory (or family of
sufficiently similar theories).

2008]

CONSTITUTIONAL POSSIBILITIES

335

feasible bench) to form a consensus on any nonoriginalist theory. Understanding this
interpretation of Scalia’s argument requires us to specify the relevant agent: for whom
would consensus on a particular nonoriginalist theory be impossible. If his claim is
about the current bench (e.g., all federal judges or all Supreme Court Justices), then
Scalia’s argument faces severe difficulties. Scalia’s claim would be trivially false if
viewed as a claim about what is possible for the federal bench as a collective actor: it is
not impossible for the collectivity of federal judges to adopt Dworkin’s theory of law
as integrity. But if Scalia’s claim is not a claim about the collectivity, then it runs into a
double standard problem. Suppose we hold the attitudes of judges about the proper
methodology for constitutional interpretation constant. It will then be the case that
consensus on any one nonoriginalist theory is impossible, but if we apply this same
standard to originalism, it becomes apparent that consensus on originalism would also
be impossible. Just as the current set of judges or Justices do not agree on any one
nonoriginalist theory, they also do not agree on originalism. For these reasons, the
“current bench interpretation” of Scalia’s impossibility claim is implausible. Either
judges can change their minds or they can’t. If they can, then they could agree on some
rival of originalism; if they cannot, then consensus on originalism is no more possible
than is consensus on one of originalism’s rivals.
Yet another variation of Scalia’s impossibility claim might focus on the possible
configurations of the future bench—given appointments process and political realities.
Call this the “politically feasible bench interpretation.” That is, Scalia might be arguing
that it is politically feasible to appoint an originalist federal bench, but that it would not
be politically feasible to appoint federal judges who would agree on a single
nonoriginalist approach. If this were Scalia’s claim, then it seems unlikely to be correct
as an empirical matter—at least over the long run. There is no consensus among
existing political actors that originalist judges are acceptable. Of course, there may be
agreement on the abstract proposition that judges should enforce the commands of the
constitutional text, and even that historical evidence of original meaning should be
considered. But that agreement is likely to become shaky as soon as particular
constitutional controversies—such as the death penalty, abortion, or affirmative
action—enter into the discussion. It may be possible that political alignment plus a
cluster of Supreme Court vacancies would permit appointments creating a majority of
five originalists on the Supreme Court, but if that is the standard then it would seem
that equally plausible scenarios would enable the appointment of a majority of five
nonoriginalist justices who agreed on a single rival to originalism.
Suppose we reject the conceptual current-bench politically-feasible-bench
interpretations of Scalia’s argument. How else might we interpret his impossibility
claim? Another alternative is suggested by the following passage:
Now the main danger in judicial interpretation of the Constitution—or, for that
matter, in judicial interpretation of any law—is that the judges will mistake their
own predilections for the law. Avoiding this error is the hardest part of being a
conscientious judge; perhaps no conscientious judge ever succeeds entirely.
Nonoriginalism, which under one or another formulation invokes “fundamental
values” as the touchstone of constitutionality, plays precisely to this weakness. It
is very difficult for a person to discern a difference between those political values
that he personally thinks most important, and those political values that are
“fundamental to our society.” Thus, by the adoption of such a criterion judicial
personalization of the law is enormously facilitated. (One might reduce this danger
by insisting that the new “fundamental values” invoked to replace original
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meaning be clearly and objectively manifested in the laws of the society. But
among all the varying tests suggested by nonoriginalist theoreticians, I am
unaware that that one ever appears. Most if not all nonoriginalists, for example,
would strike down the death penalty, though it continues to be widely adopted in
both state and federal legislation.) 74

What light does this passage shed on Scalia’s impossibility claim? First, it clarifies that
by “nonoriginalism,” Scalia actually means to refer to theories of interpretation that
focus on those values that are fundamental to our society. Second, what Scalia claims
is impossible seems to be discernment of the difference between those values that are
fundamental to our society and those values that the individual (e.g., the judge or other
official interpreting the Constitution) believes are fundamental. These two points
suggest a reconstruction of Scalia’s claim. Given the fundamental values approach, it is
difficult for individuals to discern the difference between their own values and the
values that are fundamental to our society. Some individuals will succeed, but others
will fail. Given that some will fail and given the fact of pluralism (that there are a
plurality of views about which values are fundamental), no consensus on the content of
the values that are fundamental to our society can emerge. Therefore, it is impossible
for adherents to a fundamental values approach to reach agreement on what the
Constitution means.
How does Scalia’s argument fare if judged by the standards for modal constitutional
argument set out above? 75 The first standard requires that the criteria for modal claims
be articulated: it seems reasonably clear that Scalia does not attempt (either explicitly
or implicitly) to articulate the criteria for impossibility that forms the basis of his claim.
The second standard requires explicit statement of the evidence for impossibility.
Scalia offers no evidence for his claim, although he may have offered an explanation
of the mechanism—that discernment is difficult. The third standard calls for avoidance
of double standards. Application of the third standard is difficult, because of the
ambiguity and vagueness of Scalia’s impossibility claim. Is consensus on original
meaning possible (or “less difficult”) than consensus on “the values that are
fundamental to our society?” A good answer to that question will take us too far afield
of the focus of this inquiry—the logic of modality in constitutional discourse.
CONCLUSION: THE PROBLEM OF FALSE CONSTITUTIONAL NECESSITY
This Essay began with the problem of illusory constitutional possibilities. That
problem can be addressed with a variety of tools. Constitutional theorists can recognize
that there is an important role for ideal constitutional theory, while recognizing the
dangers of bad utopianism. They can play close attention to idea of a constitutional
second best and rigorously define the criteria for inclusion in the feasible choice set.
Constitutional theorists can explicitly articulate assumptions about agency and the
scope of decision. They can disambiguate the various sense of possibility and utilize
the tools of positive constitutional theory to construct sound arguments about
constitutional possibility.

74. Scalia, supra note 68, at 863.
75. See discussion supra Part III.B.
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The problem of illusory constitutional possibility has an evil twin: the problem of
false constitutional necessity. 76 It requires little effort to make the case that any truly
significant constitutional change is a practical impossibility and draw the conclusion
that questions of constitutional design should be off the table of constitutional theory.
At any given time, the chance that action by any given individual would make a crucial
contribution and enable a constitutional reform that would otherwise fail surely
approachs zero. Taken to an extreme, this approach would limit the domain of
constitutional theory to the constitutional questions that are contestable given the
current configuration of judicial electoral politics. That is, we might limit our horizon
of constitutional possibilities to adjacent possible worlds that are practically accessible
to key political and constitutional actors in actual world.
Limiting our constitutional horizons in this way would be a mistake. The
Constitution of 1789, the Reconstruction Amendments, popular election of Senators,
and the franchise for women are all part of the history of the actual world. Although
some constitutional possibilities may be illusory, it is surely true that in the long run,
there are few constitutional necessities that take serious options off the table. And if
one believes that normative constitutional theory should take the long view—should
seek constitutional knowledge with relevance that transcends particular moments in
constitutional history, then most claims of constitutional necessity are false. Practical
constitutional theory operates in the space between illusory constitutional possibilities
and true constitutional necessity.

76. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTINECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY
(rev. ed., 2004).
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